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Abstract: 
Cryptocurrencies and their underlying blockchain technology have begun to transform numerous industries. Although 
we have seen an uptrend in the types of created cryptocurrencies, it has not yet translated into mainstream adoption., 
In this paper, we use value-sensitive design principles to identify values among current and potential cryptocurrency 
adopters. Using Bitcoin as the context for this qualitative research study, we use grounded theory analytical 
techniques to discover manifested values among users and non-users. We develop a cryptocurrency value-sensitive 
design framework to summarize our results. As our main contribution, we offer a research agenda based on the 
cryptocurrency stakeholders’ underlying value system. This agenda can help information systems scholars apply this 
value-sensitive design perspective to their own cryptocurrency research. 
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1 Introduction 
*All* crypto communities, Ethereum included, should heed these words of warning. Need to differentiate 
between getting hundreds of billions of dollars of digital paper wealth sloshing around and actually 
achieving something meaningful for society. —Vitalik Buterin (2017, emphasis in original) 
Ethereum creator Vitalik Buterin tweeted the above warning to participants in the cryptocurrency economy 
in December, 2017. With the tweet, Buterin reminded people that the individuals who originally designed 
cryptocurrencies did so for societal benefits such as financial inclusion, money democratization, and 
improved transactional efficiency. However, the cryptocurrency economy’s original vision seems to be 
fading away as individuals use cryptocurrencies for illicit purposes and financial speculation. 
The cryptocurrency economy started with Bitcoin’s public launch in 2009. Many recognize Bitcoin, a 
distributed, digital cryptocurrency, as the first open and decentralized currency. A publicly distributed 
ledger known as a blockchain records bitcoin transactions (Möser, Böhme, & Breuker, 2013; Sas & 
Khairuddin, 2017). Blockchain allows for secure, transparent transactions while protecting the transacting 
parties’ identities.  
Bitcoin represents an innovative payment network that provides an alternative to institution-backed 
financial instruments such as bonds and national fiat currencies (Vigna & Casey, 2015). As at March, 
2019, Bitcoin’s market capitalization—approximately US$69 billion—constituted more than 50 percent of 
all cryptocurrencies’ market capitalization. Today, one can trade more than 1,400 cryptocurrencies that 
adopt a similar design principle to Bitcoin (including LiteCoin, Ethereum, Steem, Dash, Ripple, and 
Monero). Users can access and trade these cryptocurrencies on more than 200 privately run exchanges 
such as Coinbase.  
Despite Bitcoin’s advantages, people treat the cryptocurrency with suspicion due to its popularity in gray 
markets and its association with infamous security attacks and large-scale exchange failures (Ingram 
Bogusz & Morisse, 2018). Overall, Bitcoin has not seen widespread adoption among either businesses or 
individuals as a favored payment mode (Polasik, Piotrowska, Wisniewski, Kotkowski, & Lightfoot, 2015), 
and governments continue to debate its legality (Twomey, 2013). Similarly, financial institutions, such as 
banks and payment gateways, do not generally accept Bitcoin (Lo & Wang, 2015; Yermack 2015). 
To date, information systems (IS) research on cryptocurrencies, though rare, has primarily focused on 
Bitcoin. Researchers have explained cryptocurrencies with theoretical concepts such as innovation 
diffusion (Catalini & Tucker, 2017), design (Subramanian, 2017), economic factors (Hayes, 2017; Liu & 
Tsyvinski, 2018; Mai, Shan, Bai, Wang, & Chiang, 2018), and usability (Hawlitschek, Notheisen, & 
Teubner, 2018; Notheisen, Hawlitschek, & Weinhardt, 2017). Generally speaking, researchers have failed 
to investigate socio-technical factors such as situational constructs, functional challenges, and societal 
outcomes (Porru, Pinna, Marchesi, & Tonelli, 2017).  
Cryptocurrency stakeholders have diverse value systems that influence adoption and use that result in 
paradoxical outcomes that prior research does not explain well. Although a body of research on 
cryptocurrencies has emerged, to the best of our knowledge, no theoretical frameworks investigate the 
values that cryptocurrency stakeholders have and how these values influence user behavior in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. Scholars and practitioners alike need overall guidance as to what directions 
cryptocurrency and distributed application designers should take to incorporate values that will motivate 
users to adopt cryptocurrencies and use them more responsibly. Even though other academic disciplines, 
including computer science, economics, and finance, have focused on Bitcoin research, we in the IS 
discipline need an IS research framework to better understand the cryptocurrency ecosystem and the 
challenges stakeholders face from a socio-technical and interdisciplinary perspective (Sas & Khairuddin, 
2017).  
Accordingly, to explain cryptocurrency uptake, we conducted a qualitative research study to examine the 
value system underlying cryptocurrency design and use. We explored the following research questions 
(RQ): 
RQ1: What underlying value system drives cryptocurrency design, adoption, and use? 
RQ2: How can these values guide future research about cryptocurrency adoption and usage? 
In this study, we use Bitcoin as the context for the following reasons: 1) most cryptocurrencies follow 
Bitcoin’s original blockchain design, 2) Bitcoin represents the most adopted cryptocurrency and accounts 
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for more than 50 percent of the total cryptocurrency market capitalization, and 3) scholars can access a 
relatively large user population with Bitcoin compared to other cryptocurrencies. 
In this study, we have three research objectives. First, we focus on determining the original intended 
design values that Nakamoto (2018) (i.e., Bitcoin’s creator)1 envisioned from available documentation. 
Second, we focus on discovering cryptocurrency use’s underlying values using the principles of value-
sensitive design (VSD) among Bitcoin users and non-users. For example, Bitcoin’s use for illicit purposes 
creates friction with the values of Bitcoin’s decentralized and trustless design that facilitates anonymous 
transactions across geographic and economic boundaries. Third, we focus on proposing a research 
framework based on the intended values and the manifested values we discover. The resultant research 
agenda can guide future research for cryptocurrencies and decentralized applications.  
To achieve our research objectives, we drew on the VSD approach (Friedman, Kahn, & Borning, 2008) to 
conduct a qualitative research study on Bitcoin use. By applying VSD, we identified benefits and harms in 
using Bitcoin and associate them with eight values that support Bitcoin use (access, laissez faire, 
efficiency, self-governance, ownership and property, privacy, responsible innovation, and trust). We show 
how the original values that Nakamoto (2008) embedded in Bitcoin’s design differ from the manifested 
values of practice. For instance, even though Nakamoto designed Bitcoin to facilitate financial inclusion, 
people have not been able to participate in the cryptocurrency economy due to the difficulties they face in 
acquiring and using Bitcoin. Others have expressed concern regarding its use for criminal activities such 
as drug trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering, which have stigmatized Bitcoin in recent years. 
This negative association has deterred some individuals from considering using the currency.  
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we summarize relevant IS literature on cryptocurrencies, 
blockchain, and VSD methodology. In Section 3, we present the research method we followed. In Section 
4, we describe our results. In Section 5, we present the cryptocurrency VSD research framework based 
on our analysis. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude by highlighting key findings, limitations, and future 
research avenues. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Cryptocurrency IS Research 
Most research on cryptocurrency to date has focused on Bitcoin. Researchers have begun using Bitcoin 
to provide a novel research context for extending IS theories about how individuals (Connolly & Kick, 
2015) and organizations (Catalini & Tucker, 2017) adopt and use new technologies. At the organizational 
level, Bitcoin’s adoption as a payment method critically depends on vendors that accept Bitcoin in 
exchange for goods or services (Connolly & Kick, 2015). Early organizational adopters that accept Bitcoin 
exhibit a higher IT readiness, innovativeness, and social media presence than their non-adopting 
counterparts. At the individual level, through the theoretical lens of the diffusion of innovations, Catalini 
and Tucker (2017) showed that natural early adopters (NEAs) may abandon a new technology such as 
Bitcoin if they believe the advantages they gain from adopting it and their feelings about being unique 
have diminished. Hawlitschek et al. (2018) focused on how actors may leverage blockchain-based 
systems’ trust-free properties in the sharing economy and highlighted how user trust in blockchain-based, 
trust-free applications differs significantly from trust in the sharing economy. Bitcoin serves as an 
appropriate context in which to study stigma’s implications. For this reason, Ingram Bogusz and Morisse 
(2018) used the Bitcoin context to study the role that ideology and digital infrastructure play in how 
entrepreneurs form stigma responses and illustrated the difficulties entrepreneurs experience when 
distancing themselves from stigmatized digital infrastructure and their communities. Proposing a shift from 
normative regulation to market regulation of the peer review system, IS researchers have proposed a 
token-based peer review payment system to clear the backlog in the review pipeline by compensating 
peers for their reviews (Avital, 2018). Some studies have investigated how to improve Bitcoin’s technical 
properties by enhancing the underlying cryptography (Reid & Harrigan, 2011), proof-of-work algorithms 
(Saini, 2018), anonymity and privacy characteristics, and power conservation and efficiency (Ballis, 2017). 
 
1 In this paper, we sometimes use “he” to refer to Nakamoto; however, we acknowledge Nakamoto’s identity remains unknown. 
Further, we also acknowledge that Nakamoto may actually refer to several people and that many individuals had some part in 
developing Bitcoin despite referring to Bitcoin’s “creator” (rather than creators). Indeed, though Satoshi disappeared in 2009, the next 
generation of core developers of the Bitcoin ecosystem have continued to develop, design, and feature rollouts of the Bitcoin 
ecosystem. 
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Other studies have focused on economic factors such as price volatility (Polasik et al., 2015), exchange 
rates (Li & Wang, 2017), cryptocurrency risks and returns (Liu & Tsyvinski, 2018), and valuations (Hayes, 
2017; Liu & Tsyvinski, 2018; Mai et al., 2018). Legal scholars have focused on regulatory concerns such 
as preventing money laundering and illicit anonymous usage that cryptocurrencies present (Jacquez, 
2016; Twomey, 2013).  
Cryptocurrencies provide a rich potential context for interdisciplinary theoretical collaboration because 
they span many areas such as law, economics, and finance. Yet, IS research on cryptocurrency remains 
sparse. We believe that the IS community has just begun to scratch the surface of developing theoretical 
perspectives to understand the complexity of the socio-technical issues that cryptocurrency presents. 
2.2 Blockchain Research Frameworks on Design, Adoption, and Use 
While research in mainstream journals has rarely studied cryptocurrency adoption, much more research has 
examined blockchain’s (i.e., the technology underlying cryptocurrency) design, adoption, and use. Indeed, 
several research papers have presented blockchain research frameworks in IS and computer science.  
Risius and Spohrer (2017) presented a blockchain research framework based on extensively surveying IS 
papers on the topic. They also presented a multilevel, multidisciplinary research framework for users and 
society, intermediaries, and platforms that they adapted from the social media research agenda that Aral, 
Dellarocas, and Godes (2013) developed. Yli-Huumo, Ko, Choi, Park, and Smolander (2016) 
systematically reviewed the blockchain literature and classified papers based on concepts such as 
security, wasted resources, usability, throughput, privacy, and smart contracts. Mendling et al. (2018) 
discussed future research directions and the challenges of blockchain adoption based on the business 
process management lifecycle. Similarly, Gökalp, Gökalp, Çoban, and Eren (2018) analyzed challenges 
and opportunities for blockchain technologies in healthcare by studying how patients can share private 
health data among themselves. Another stream of blockchain-related research has focused on how to 
standardize health information databases by anonymizing user data (Peterson, Deeduvanu, Kanjamala, & 
Boles, 2016; Yue, Wang, Jin, Li, & Jiang, 2016). Several scholars have proposed design-based 
approaches for blockchain applications such as know-your-customer (KYC) optimization (Moyano & Ross, 
2017), real-world asset trading (Cholewa & Shanmugam, 2017), fraud prevention (Hyvärinen, Risius, & 
Friis, 2017), automated financial contracts (Egelund-Müller, Elsman, Henglein, & Ross, 2017), accounting 
and assurance services (Dai & Vasarhelyi, 2017), and peer-review systems (Avital, 2018).  
However, these research frameworks neither focus on cryptocurrencies nor take a VSD perspective. In 
Section 2.3, we present the VSD literature relevant to our study. 
2.3 Value-sensitive Design 
VSD is a value-oriented design methodology that researchers in human-computer interaction commonly 
adopt (Deng, Joshi, & Galliers, 2016). The IS research community has used VSD to study privacy-
enhancing tools in browsers (Xu, Crossler, & Bélanger, 2012), informed consent in Web-based 
interactions (Friedman, Howe, & Felte, 2002), and marginalization and empowerment in crowdsourcing 
communities (Deng et al., 2016). Across these studies, applying a VSD approach has enabled 
researchers to develop design recommendations, research agendas, and suggestions to improve design 
and practice. A theoretically grounded approach to technology design, VSD focuses on explaining how we 
can account for human values such as autonomy, fairness, and transparency in computer technology 
design (Deng et al., 2016). VSD has a three-part methodology that includes conceptual, empirical, and 
technical investigations to guide design (Friedman et al., 2008).  
In the empirical investigation, researchers focus on users’ actual or potential responses to technical 
artifacts and use contexts. Conceptual investigation involves theoretically studying values. In the 
conceptual investigation phase, researchers use data gathered during the empirical investigation to 
identify the values involved in the interactions between stakeholders and technology. The conceptual 
stage relies on previous research to clearly define relevant values. During the technology investigation 
stage, researchers focus on the technology and aim to understand how technical features facilitate, 
support, or hinder the values that they identified in the conceptual investigation. This stage can facilitate 
the technology’s design or redesign to better accommodate the desirable values by suggesting 
alternatives or improvements. Designers can conduct the three investigations recursively in that findings 
from new investigations can build on earlier results. As a result, one would need a multiphase study to fill 
in gaps discovered in earlier results.  
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Consistent with earlier VSD research (Friedman et al., 2008; Simpson & Weiner, 1989), we follow the Oxford 
English Dictionary in defining value as: “The principles or standards of a person or society, the personal or 
societal judgment of what is valuable and important in life”. Value-sensitive IS discourse has emphasized the 
good, rights, obligations, virtue, moral judgment, truth, and ethics. However, there is often a trade-off 
between system usability and values. Usability refers to a system’s characteristics that make it functional, 
easy to learn and use, consistent, and easily recoverable from errors. However, even with usable systems, 
some people might not find the systems to be socially acceptable given their moral values.  
Designers can accommodate both usability and human values that have ethical importance in the same 
design. Four paired relationships exist between usability and human values with ethical importance 
(Friedman et al., 2008). The first relationship covers designs good for usability and for human values with 
ethical import. For example, browser designs that offer efficient cookie management promote informed 
consent and privacy. The second relationship covers designs good for human values with ethical import at 
the expense of usability. Two-factor security designs, where users must use two forms of authentication to 
access a system, exemplify this relationship. Such systems support privacy and security. Nevertheless, 
some people may find that they become unwieldy to use, and the nuisance factor may push them away. 
The third relationship covers designs that require good usability to support ethically important human 
values. For example, a fair national election system that uses computerized voting systems requires all 
voting-age citizens to use the system. The fourth relationship covers designs good for usability that may 
come at the expense of human values with ethical importance. For example, Bitcoin seems to exemplify 
this relationship: the cryptocurrency provides an efficient monetary system but, due to speculation, has 
high price volatility and supports criminal and immoral activity at the expense of human values (e.g., 
honesty, trustworthiness, and security) (Martin, 2014). Accordingly, we need to remain aware of the 
relationships between usability and human values. At times, the two support each other, while, at other 
times, one may need to pursue a closer alignment between them.  
Past literature on designing information systems with VSD principles in mind has focused on IT artifacts in 
organizations such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and Internet browsers, and researchers have primarily 
studied these tools’ use from a usability perspective. In this study, we investigate cryptocurrencies’ 
empirical and conceptual underlying values using Bitcoin as a case study. Similarly, as we discuss above, 
researchers have derived prior research frameworks on the blockchain either from a detailed literature 
survey, a meta-analysis across multiple domains, or through a design lens. We present a value-based 
framework that can guide future research and efforts to design cryptocurrency-based applications. 
3 Research Method 
We carried out a qualitative study in which we focused on understanding how Bitcoin users and non-users 
perceive the cryptocurrency and explored their reasons for choosing to adopt or avoid it. To apply value-
sensitive design, Friedman et al. (2008) recommend that, once researchers identify a system’s key 
stakeholders, they should systematically identify its benefits and harms for each stakeholder group. With 
this list of benefits and harms in hand, the researchers can then map these aspects onto corresponding 
value categories and identify potential value conflicts. In the final step, the researchers integrate value 
considerations into guidelines that inform system design. We employ a similar approach to identify the 
values associated with Bitcoin use. Based on the context of our study, each value represents a benefit to 
a user or a harm (or challenge). Further, we group these values into value categories that inform a VSD-
based research agenda for improving cryptocurrencies. 
3.1 Data Collection 
We collected data in three phases between 2016 and 2018. As is customary in qualitative research, we 
employed a hybrid approach in which we conducted inductive-deductive coding and developed themes. In 
doing so, we could develop the interview protocol for each phase by drawing on the previous one’s results 
(Glaser & Strauss, 2017). Specifically, we sought to improve our ongoing data collection and analysis by 
using results from prior phases to identify conceptual gaps we wanted to explore.  
In the first phase, we conducted a focus group study in which interviewed 12 prominent members of a 
nationally recognized Bitcoin meetup group in South Florida who organize meetings on meetup.com. The 
meetup group, which mostly included Bitcoin stakeholders such as application developers and 
cryptocurrency entrepreneurs, had over 2,000 members who actively promoted cryptocurrency in the 
southeastern United States. However, active members in other meetups did not respond to our interview 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 516 
 
Volume 45 10.17705/1CAIS.04527 Paper 27 
 
requests, so we could only interview participants from this one group. In the second phase, we focused on 
understanding Bitcoin’s use outside this meetup group. In particular, we focused on understanding why 
some individuals did not either hold or use it at all. Using Qualtrics software, we emailed interview 
questions to 110 randomly chosen students enrolled in the evening MBA and BBA programs at a large 
university in the southeastern United States.  
In the third phase, we focused on better understanding the stakeholder perspective. To do so, we 
interviewed key participants from across the broader cryptocurrency ecosystem. We included individuals 
based on the following criteria: 1) they were professionals who participated  in the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem on a day-to-day basis and 2) they understood the technology and had a major role in the 
cryptocurrency community (e.g., as miners, investors, application developers, media practitioners, or 
researchers). We personally contacted about 100 stakeholders through professional forums, Facebook 
groups, Reddit groups, industry panels, and LinkedIn. In all, 41 subjects that we contacted by email 
consented to email interviews. Appendix A and Appendix B detail each stage of our interview protocol and 
the demographics of these interview subjects, respectively. 
3.2 Data Analysis 
We analyzed our data in two phases. In the first phase, we determined the original values that Nakamoto 
(2008) embedded in Bitcoin’s design by identifying the design features he introduced in his white paper 
and mapped them onto their respective value categories. Accordingly, we identified five intended design 
values in Bitcoin: decentralization, efficiency, trust, ownership and property, and privacy. 
Table 1. Original Values Underlying Bitcoin’s Design from Nakamoto (2008) 
Value Design features Implementation 
Decentralization 
Decentralized design 
A model that supports two things: a foolproof distributed validation of 
transactions and prevention of double spending. 
Irreversible 
transactions 
A blockchain records transactions via a verification process that users 
cannot reverse or remove from the blockchain. 
Transparency 
A publicly available and accessible transaction log in the form of a 
ledger (i.e., blockchain). Any user or program can validate a 
transaction or the balances available given the user’s private/public key 
combinations. 
Efficiency 
Disintermediation 
The design eliminates trusted third-party mediators such as financial 
institutions to enable peer-to-peer transfer.  
Combination and 
splitting of value 
Transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs, which allows users to 
split and combine value.  
Reclaiming of disk 
space 
The design saves hard disk space by compacting old blocks and 
discarding spent transaction records.  
Low transaction costs 
The design reduces transaction costs by eliminating mediators and 
reversible transactions.  
Trust 
Trust-free 
Transaction validation based on cryptographic proof rather than other 
forms of trust. 
Double-spending 
problem solution 
The design eliminates fraud by preventing users from simultaneously 
sending the same payment to multiple peers. 
Time-stamp server 
Servers confirm each block’s validity, which prevents users from 
manipulating the transactions’ order.  
Simplified payment 
verification 
The design reliably verifies at most 50 percent of the hash power—that 
is, the total network’s mining power follows the correct algorithm for 
validating transactions. 
Ownership and 
property 
Incentives 
Nodes participate in the mining function and receive rewards new coins 
on the network for doing so.  
Privacy Pseudo-anonymity 
Parties have limited access to information about other involved parties  
(individuals who transact need not disclose their identities on the 
network).  
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In the second phase, we analyzed the data we collected from all stakeholders to determine the values that 
users and non-users held about Bitcoin. We mapped these values onto research themes to form the 
cryptocurrency VSD framework that we present in Section 5. To conduct this analysis, we used NVIVO 12 
to independently code the transcribed interview responses from the members of the Bitcoin meetup group 
and the text from the email interviews. We inductively derived factors we considered the benefits and 
harms of Bitcoin adoption (Richards, 2014). Applying analytical grounded theory techniques (refer 
Appendix C), we developed open codes that represented Bitcoin’s benefits and harms and axial codes for 
the user value categories underlying them (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1990). We tested for inter-rater 
reliability (IRR) once we completed the coding. Among the coders, after three iterations, we attained an 
IRR of 95 percent. Cohen’s kappa was 0.79, which exceeds the recommended threshold of 0.75 (Eugenio 
& Glass, 2004; McHugh 2012). We then further grouped the value categories into selective codes to 
represent research themes and used these codes to develop our VSD framework for analyzing 
cryptocurrencies. 
To test our coding schema’s validity and reliability (i.e., open axial codes and selective codes), three 
doctoral students independently validated our coding schema using a two-stage q-sorting process. The 
coding schema included code definitions with examples from our previous coding round. The doctoral 
candidates independently categorized the open codes (values) into axial codes (value categories). Then, 
they categorized the axial codes into selective codes (research themes). When their initial IRR did not 
reach 75 percent, we revised the coding schema by merging codes and revisiting the literature to refine 
code definitions. We then repeated the q-sort exercise with the students a second time, and they obtained 
an IRR greater than 75 percent and a Cohen’s kappa greater than 0.75. We describe our grounded 
theory-based analytics in detail in Appendix C. 
To identify user categories, we classified our respondents into user and non-user groups by clustering 
individual respondents based on the values (axial codes) and value categories they expressed. We 
identified three user groups: innovators, conventional users, and sensitive transaction users. Further, we 
identified two non-user groups: potential adopters (non-users who would likely adopt Bitcoin in the future) 
and non-adopters (individuals who did not use Bitcoin and would likely never do so). We report the results 
in Table 2. We describe each value in detail in Appendix D. 
Table 2. Bitcoin’s Value Categories and Values from Survey Respondents 
Value category 
(count) 
Definition Benefits Harms (challenges) 
Access 
(483) 
Open and equal access to monetary 
systems (modified from Deng et al., 2016) 
Democratization 
Financial inclusion 
Global acceptance 
Usefulness 
Varied transactions 
Enables ecommerce 
Low network effects 
Complexity 
Technical jargon 
Difficult to use 
Laissez faire 
(86) 
Right of private parties to transact free from 
government intervention  
Freedom from regulation 
Censorship resistant 
 
Regulatory 
challenges 
Regulatory ambiguity 
Political lobbying 
Efficiency 
(126) 
Ability to accomplish a task with the least 
waste of time and effort 
Hyper-fungible 
Robust technical features 
High transaction 
costs 
High transaction 
times 
Blockchain bloat 
Network latency 
High energy 
consumption 
High mining costs 
Technical limitations 
Self-governance 
(51) 
Autonomous: exercising control or rule over 
oneself 
 
Self-regulation 
Subcultural influences 
Concentration of 
mining power 
Lack of consensus 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 518 
 
Volume 45 10.17705/1CAIS.04527 Paper 27 
 
Table 2. Bitcoin’s Value Categories and Values from Survey Respondents 
Ownership and 
property 
(78) 
Right to possess an object (or information) 
and then use it, manage it, derive income 
from it, and bequeath it (Friedman et al., 
2008) 
Property rights 
Investment and trade 
Lack of physicality 
Privacy 
(21) 
An individual’s claim, entitlement, or right to 
determine what personal information is 
communicated to others (Friedman et al., 
2008) 
Anonymity and privacy of 
transactions 
Transparent transactions 
Lack of traceability 
Responsible 
innovation 
(12) 
Incorporating beneficial values into the 
innovation process to benefit all stakeholders 
Social, ethical, and legal 
factors 
 
Poor environmental 
sustainability 
High power 
consumption 
Trust 
(156) 
The predictability of the system’s 
performance: security, reliability, safety, and 
survivability (Friedman et al., 2008). 
Security 
Secure transactions 
Security policies 
Irreversible transactions 
Stigma 
Negative reputation 
Volatility 
Investment risk 
Scams 
4 Results 
We present our results in two parts. First, we describe how individuals vary in their access to 
cryptocurrencies and regulated payment systems. We illustrate how bitcoin adoption is a continuum of 
user involvement and transactions spanning this spectrum. We then explain the top three values across 
the different user categories. Second, we discuss the value categories underlying Bitcoin adoption and 
use in practice to understand how Bitcoin’s implementation reflects its designer’s intended values and how 
users have interpreted these values (refer to Table 2). Overall, we found that the respondents shared 
eight general value types associated with Bitcoin use: access, efficiency, laissez faire, ownership and 
property, privacy, responsible innovation, self-governance, and trust. Compared to Bitcoin’s designer’s 
intended values, users perceived four additional value types: access, self-governance, laissez faire, and 
responsible innovation. While the designer’s intended values benefit the cryptocurrency ecosystem, the 
resulting harms (challenges) that occurred after implementation created tension with the designer’s 
intended values. For example, the designer’s intended privacy to be a benefit that users would value. 
However, the privacy that Bitcoin provides does not allow one to trace transactions—a property that 
supports illegal transactions. The results of our qualitative analysis elaborate on this tension and reveal 
Bitcoin’s harms (challenges) that its designer may not have anticipated. 
4.1 Bitcoin Adoption Continuum 
Figure 1 portrays the Bitcoin adoption continuum: it illustrates how groups of individuals vary in their 
access to cryptocurrencies and regulated payment systems to carry out their transactions. We found that 
users conduct various types of transactions as they go about their daily lives, such as ecommerce 
payments; money transfers to friends, family, or employees; and payments for sensitive transactions that 
users may wish to keep confidential. The continuum serves as an appropriate tool to account for how 
individual use varies and how each transaction has dynamic sensitivity. 
 
Figure 1. Continuum of Cryptocurrency Usage and Types of Users 
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The center of the continuum represents individuals who can use both cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin 
and regulated monetary systems. The left of the continuum represents users who use cryptocurrencies to 
conduct sensitive and possibly illicit transactions (e.g., purchasing contraband on the dark Web) because 
they cannot use regulated monetary systems to do so. The extreme right of the continuum represents 
users who cannot use cryptocurrencies perhaps due to their inability to understand how to use and 
leverage cryptocurrencies or the costs associated with acquiring them. These users typically rely on 
traditional regulated monetary systems to carry out their daily transactions. Users can change their 
position along the continuum at any point depending on the nature of the transactions they wish to carry 
out and their competency in carrying out these transactions using cryptocurrencies.  
Based on our results, we attempted to understand Bitcoin adoption’s benefits and harms among the five 
groups of individuals (i.e., innovators, conventional Bitcoin users, sensitive transaction users, potential 
Bitcoin non-adopters, and potential Bitcoin adopters).  
Innovators, the first group, adopted Bitcoin early on. Although these users made transactions using 
regulated payment systems, new technology piqued their interest, and they tended to use Bitcoin for 
regular ecommerce such as buying, selling, and trading goods. Innovators already accepted Bitcoin as at 
least a partial substitute for traditional payment methods due to their perceived values about using it, such 
as newness, convenience, and time savings. Many innovators have also used Bitcoin-based applications 
such as Lawnmover or Sweatcoin. For innovators, adoption benefits included opportunities for investment 
and trade, transactions that avoid regulated monetary systems, and Bitcoin’s robust technical features. 
However, for innovators, disadvantages included potential scams, the problems associated with negative 
social perception, and technical flaws such as blockchain bloat.  
Conventional Bitcoin users, the second group, adopted Bitcoin after it gained social traction. They 
generally used Bitcoin for legitimate purposes such as ecommerce, investments, and remittances. For 
conventional Bitcoin users, adoption benefits included investment opportunities, the ability to conduct 
transactions that regulated monetary systems do not allow, and the ability to facilitate global ecommerce 
platforms. However, for conventional users, disadvantages included price volatility, low acceptance by 
merchants and financial institutions, and high transaction costs. Because innovators and conventional 
Bitcoin users engage in legitimate transactions, they can carry out their Bitcoin transactions using 
alternative regulated payment systems without violating laws or regulations. Thus, they have access to 
both Bitcoin and regulated payment systems. 
 Sensitive transaction users, the third group, used Bitcoin to engage in sensitive transactions due to the 
inherent risk of detection if processed through regulated financial systems (e.g., credit cards, checks). 
Regulated financial systems conduct know-your-customer (KYC) procedures to monitor the legality of 
customer transactions. Thus, they constrain some users from conducting sensitive transactions, such as 
money laundering and drug trafficking, for legal reasons. To a large extent, underground marketplaces 
such as those on the dark Web mandate that users use Bitcoin for payments, so users who conduct 
transactions there have no option but to use it. Another set of sensitive transaction users use Bitcoin to 
conceal legitimate transactions, such as buying legitimate prostitution or recreational marijuana. As Table 
3 shows, adoption benefits for sensitive transaction users included Bitcoin’s supporting sensitive 
transactions, privacy, anonymity, and risk mitigation. 
Table 3. Top Benefits and Harms (Challenges) for Bitcoin Users 
 Top three benefits (percent of total 
responders who reported these 
factors as benefits of using Bitcoin) * 
Top three harms / challenges (percent of 
total responders who reported these factors 
as harms / challenges of using Bitcoin) * 
Innovators 
Usefulness (17.90%) 
Investment and trade (12.34%) 
Financial inclusion (9.87%) 
Regulation (5%) 
Scams (4.32%) 
Complexity (5.1%) 
Conventional users 
Usefulness (22.5%) 
Financial inclusion (18.5%) 
Global acceptance (2%) 
Volatility (1.42%) 
Low network effects (12.04%) 
High transaction times (3.2%) 
Sensitive transaction 
users 
Sensitive transactions (1.6 %) 
Risk mitigation (1.5%) 
Privacy (3.3%) 
Scams (1.25%) 
High transaction costs (3.3%) 
Technical flaws (2.1%) 
* The values overlap across users. 
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As Table 4 shows, we found two bitcoin non-user groups that did not have access to cryptocurrencies. 
Bitcoin non-users effectively could not access the cryptocurrency ecosystem altogether. Potential 
adopters, the fourth group, understood how Bitcoin works but were hesitant to use it. This group had not 
decided to replace traditional payment methods with cryptocurrencies. For potential adopters, benefits 
included Bitcoin’s global adoption, robust technology validation features, and its ability to increase 
financial inclusion. For them, disadvantages included stigma, low network effects due to low adoption 
rates among vendors and individuals, and scams. Non-adopters, the second group, had no intention to 
adopt cryptocurrencies due to their potential disadvantages such as lack of physicality, stigma attached to 
their use, and volatility. This group may have heard of Bitcoin but potentially did not appreciate how it 
could empower their lives. For non-adopters, disadvantages included Bitcoin’s lack of physicality, the 
stigma attached to its use, and volatility. This user group saw no benefits in Bitcoin since they did not 
intend to use it. 
Table 4. Benefits and Harms for Bitcoin Non-users 
 Top three benefits (percent of total 
respondents who cited these factors 
as motivators for future use) ** 
Top three harms /challenges (percent of total 
respondents who cited these factors as harms / 
challenges of adopting Bitcoin) ** 
Potential adopters 
Global acceptance (4.15%) 
Technology validation (4.30%) 
Financial Inclusion (3.65%) 
Stigma (3.5%) 
Low network effects (1.93%) 
Scams (7.74%) 
Non-adopters 
Not applicable; do not intend to use 
cryptocurrencies 
Volatility (3.4%) 
Stigma (3.65%) 
Lack of physicality (3.45%) 
* The values overlap across users. 
4.2 Bitcoin’s Underlying Value System in Practice 
In this section, the second step of our VSD methodology, we group Bitcoin’s benefits and harms and map 
them onto corresponding value categories. In Appendix D, we provide the definitions, descriptions, and 
anecdote examples we used to code these factors. 
4.2.1 Access 
Access refers to open and equal opportunity to use Bitcoin (Deng et al., 2016). Factors that facilitate or 
hinder access to Bitcoin include its democratization of money, financial inclusion, global acceptance, 
usefulness, low network effects, and complexity.  
A desire to democratize money represents a core philosophy behind Bitcoin’s creation (Nakamoto, 2008); 
that is, to provide people (especially underserved populations) with open and equal access to monetary 
systems by facilitating peer-to-peer transfers. Respondents reported that they valued that Bitcoin 
democratized money. Democracy refers to a form of governance “by the people, of the people, and for the 
people” (Lincoln & Boritt, 1990). The Bitcoin ecosystem follows a similar governance model: the Bitcoin 
protocol algorithmically validates Bitcoin transactions based on a “network of computer nodes” rather than 
a central governing authority such as a bank (Nakamoto, 2008). Though Bitcoin mining has become 
resource intensive, ordinary individuals can participate in mining through cloud mining companies such as 
the Genesis Mining Pool. 
Concerning financial inclusion, Bitcoin offers a means to include previously excluded users in the new 
financial system. For example, people who reside in locations with banking systems that do not allow 
people to conveniently open a bank account or access credit can gain financial access with Bitcoin. The 
cryptocurrency also provides a way to purchase products and services when one cannot or cannot easily 
use credit cards. It enables monetary systems in the underground economy, which regulated financial 
systems do not currently service. Further, Bitcoin has added appeal due to its potential to serve as a 
universal currency that lacks conversion fees. One can use Bitcoin for a wide variety of transactions, such 
as to replace credit card payments in ecommerce. Some merchants accept Bitcoin for retail purchases, 
business-to-business (B2B) transactions, and foreign exchange remittances.  
Bitcoin facilitates transactions that may be illegal in some states or countries (e.g., buying and selling 
marijuana). For universal usability to occur, individuals must perceive that Bitcoin has high utility. We 
found that respondents believed that Bitcoin’s properties—convenience, global payments, low transaction 
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cost, safety, security, and liquidity—made it useful. However, various alternative digital payment 
mechanisms that provide users with the same or greater usefulness have also become popular over the 
years (e.g., PayPal). Further, most regulated financial institutions and businesses do not accept Bitcoin, 
which leads to low network effects. 
Bitcoin’s perceived complexity can be daunting. Some people feel overwhelmed by the technology’s 
elaborate structure (e.g., software wallets with long private keys). Many non-users in the study pointed to 
the difficulty in using Bitcoin as money as a major deterrent to adopting it, though experts indicated to the 
contrary. 
4.2.2 Laissez Faire 
Laissez faire refers to the right for transactions between private parties to be free from government laws 
and regulation. Factors that facilitate or hinder bitcoin’s laissez faire approach include freedom from 
regulation and regulatory challenges. In Appendix D, we present the definitions, descriptions, and 
anecdote examples we used to code these factors. 
Some Bitcoin community members adopted the cryptocurrency because they believed that it exemplified 
libertarianism (i.e., a philosophical belief that values freedom from government regulation and 
intervention). Some users viewed this lack of regulation as contributing to their freedom to execute 
financial transactions and financial inclusion. One school of thought holds that formally regulating Bitcoin 
exchanges would improve adoption because it would require Bitcoin exchanges to follow legislation such 
as securities laws, which would minimize the risk that investors would face. On the one hand, insufficient 
regulation encourages innovation and faster adoption. On the other hand, insufficient regulation has led to 
Ponzi schemes and investment scams that have defrauded investors of millions of dollars (Kean, 2018).  
Current financial laws seem inadequate to handle all the regulatory challenges that abound in the 
cryptocurrency sector (Abramaowicz, 2016). Although one can use Bitcoin for regular ecommerce, one 
can also use it to launder ill-gotten wealth (Jacquez, 2016). Each country has its own laws to regulate 
Bitcoin fiat exchanges and to penalize criminal and civil offenses that individuals commit with Bitcoin. This 
legal gray area has led to lobbying efforts both for (typically from traditional financial forms) and against 
(typically from large cryptocurrency exchanges, investors, and startups who have invested in the 
economy’s financial technology (fintech) sector) cryptocurrencies (De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016).  
4.2.3 Efficiency 
Efficiency refers to the ability to accomplish a task with minimal time and effort. The factors that facilitate 
or hinder efficiency include high transaction costs, high mining costs, robust technical features, technical 
limitations, high transaction times, hyper-fungibility, and high energy consumption.  
Respondents reported that the Bitcoin network has high transaction costs. Cloud-based Bitcoin 
exchanges such as Coinbase, Bitfinex, and Kraken charge commissions between two and three percent 
of a transaction’s value. Several respondents complained that transaction costs associated with 
converting fiat currency such as U.S. dollars to bitcoins create additional adoption barriers. Similarly, 
Bitcoin automated teller machines (ATMs) and currency exchanges charge high commissions for buying 
and selling bitcoins (i.e., between eight and 12 percent). These rates exceed the ones associated with 
foreign exchange payment modes. High mining costs also effectively increase transaction costs (O’Dwyer 
& Malone, 2014).  
Some interviewees noted that they saw Bitcoin’s robust technical features and the underlying blockchain 
infrastructure’s bug-free and flawless nature despite heavy network usage as distinct advantages over 
other payment technologies. However, other interviewees believed that Bitcoin has technical limitations 
and expressed doubts about its future scalability and its encryption algorithm’s robustness. Users 
perceived certain factors, such as the need to be online to access and conduct transactions in Bitcoin, as 
key limitations. Similarly, users found high transaction validation times and technical issues such as 
blockchain bloat (i.e., where the time to download or store transactions increases with transaction volume) 
as limiting factors. Respondents also expressed concern about the energy that the computers that 
validate transactions consume due to the proof-of-work mechanism’s complexity and the node network’s 
ever-increasing size. However, despite these inefficiencies, interviewees noted that bitcoins have high 
fungibility because one can exchange them for other currencies (both fiat currencies and 
cryptocurrencies) through exchanges or in person with low fees and greater ease than most other forms of 
currency. 
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4.2.4 Self-governance 
Researchers have long acknowledged the challenge in managing globally distributed knowledge workers 
in a complex software development effort such as Bitcoin with volunteer software developers (Markus & 
Agres, 2000). In such an environment, a community of volunteer software developers accomplishes 
complex tasks through consensus, discussion, and debates. Self-governance refers to the autonomous 
aspects of the Bitcoin ecosystem, which allow the ecosystem’s various components (e.g., mining, 
application development, node maintenance) to operate without friction through commonly agreed-on 
systems and mechanics. The factors that facilitate or hinder self-governance include subcultural 
influences, self-regulation, lack of consensus, and concentration of mining power. In Appendix D, we 
provide the definitions, descriptions, and anecdote examples we used to code these factors.  
A community refers to a group of people who regularly interact with one another and share a common 
values and needs (Kuznetsov, 2006). A subculture refers to a cultural segment that shares distinguishing 
behavioral and value patterns that differ from the mainstream culture. The Bitcoin community represents a 
subculture that focuses on this shared monetary instrument, and it plays a critical role in shaping Bitcoin’s 
development and self-regulation. Members often congregate and socialize with one another in face-to-
face meetup groups, such as the one our focus group respondents belonged to, and online on social 
media such as Facebook. Apart from sharing Bitcoin usage and investment information, research subjects 
reported receiving social and financial support from other Bitcoin community members when traveling. 
Like other technology users, Bitcoin users’ peers also influence them when making adoption decisions. 
Similarly, camaraderie among Bitcoin users and a common feeling of recognition as elite technologists 
motivate both users and developers. 
Successful open source software development usually arises when self-regulated teams that depend on 
consensus to make decisions about how they should develop the software and code participate with one 
another. Prominent self-regulated teams (e.g., Bitcoin, Mozilla Foundation, Linux) can work in unison to 
create these software products (i.e., continuous improvement of the software’s quality with every new 
generation). The Bitcoin ecosystem includes self-motivated developers who usually efficiently resolve 
disagreements through mediation processes that community adopts (Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006).  
Researchers have often seen peer influence as contributing to whether disparate groups of individuals 
harmoniously function to accomplish a common goal. However, in situations with low peer influence, open 
source communities that lack a strong hierarchy or leadership find decision making difficult. These 
disagreements have spawned misunderstandings. For example, the decision to change Bitcoin’s core 
source code to increase the block size has led to disagreements among developers, which caused a 
subsequent fork of the source code and resulted in Bitcoin Cash (Böhme, Christin, Edelman, & Moore, 
2015; De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016). 
Cryptocurrency miners operate sophisticated computers with specialized software to validate transactions 
on the network in exchange for rewards in Bitcoin. Researchers have noted concentrated mining power as 
a barrier to self-governance because miners constitute a key component of Bitcoin’s ecosystem (Böhme 
et al., 2015). In some cases, concentrated mining power has enabled miners to collude to block new 
performance upgrades to the Bitcoin network. When conflicts among miners and developers develop into 
rifts, the Bitcoin network can fork in two (e.g., Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Main). 
4.2.5 Ownership and Property 
Ownership and property refer to the right to possess, use, manage, derive income from, and bequeath an 
object (or information) (Friedman et al., 2008). Factors that facilitate or hinder ownership and property in 
the Bitcoin ecosystem include property rights, investment and trade, and lack of physicality.  
Prior research shows that Bitcoin’s owners have property rights: Bitcoin has all the properties that money 
does (Lo & Wang, 2015; Van Alstyne, 2014). People can purchase, trade, and hold Bitcoin as an 
investment instrument. Some respondents preferred Bitcoin as a preferred portfolio diversification 
instrument because its price movements have no correlation (p < 0.5) with global stock price movements 
(Liu & Tsyvinski, 2018). Bitcoin has greatly appreciated in value since its inception and provided 
substantial returns to individuals who acquired it early on. Miners also receive incentives for mining 
Bitcoin. The interviewees who invested in Bitcoin applications, such as cloud mining services and 
cryptocurrency games (e.g., FortuneJack or Crypto-Games.net), reported earning substantial financial 
returns.  
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However, Bitcoin’s lack of physicality hinders individuals from adopting it. Losing the private key can mean 
that one loses access to the bitcoins in it. Interviewees found this factor as a deterrent since they had 
become accustomed to physical money or electronic financial services. While some paper Bitcoin wallets 
exist, some respondents seemed to not know about their existence. 
4.2.6 Privacy 
Privacy refers to a person’s claim, entitlement, or right to determine what information about themselves 
they or someone else can communicate to others (Friedman et al., 2008). The factors that facilitate or 
hinder privacy in the Bitcoin ecosystem include anonymity and the privacy of sensitive transactions, lack 
of traceability, and transparent transactions.  
Though one can trace Bitcoin transactions via wallet IDs, users perceive Bitcoin transactions to be 
anonymous—they believe they can mask their true identities on the network because transactions lack 
personal identifiable information. Many individuals use Bitcoin for sensitive transactions they want to carry 
out in secrecy. These transactions may or may not be legal, but the user wants to hide them because they 
may embarrass them or damage their reputation. Respondents reported that, for illegal transactions (e.g., 
transactions that involve drugs, prostitution, or money laundering), they prefer Bitcoin because the 
transactions avoid regulation and users can transfer coins globally without detection. Clandestine service 
providers such as drug dealers may demand payment in Bitcoin and, thereby, force buyers to use it. 
However, the lack of transaction traceability makes it difficult to hold persons accountable for their 
behavior in the Bitcoin ecosystem. While Bitcoin has a transparent public ledger that records every 
transaction, one cannot personally identify these transactions. As a result, one cannot easily (or at all) 
trace transactions to issue refunds or for legal purposes. Notwithstanding, some Bitcoin users who wish to 
hide a transaction’s trail may find the difficulty in tracing transactions desirable. 
4.2.7 Responsible Innovation 
Responsible innovation refers to incorporating moral values in the innovation process and making 
innovations ethically, socially, and legally desirable. Designers who value responsible innovation work to 
benefit public welfare and prevent others from adopting their innovations for harmful purposes. Thus, 
designers need to weigh the long-term impact of their innovations.  
The factors that facilitate or hinder responsible innovation in the Bitcoin ecosystem include social, legal, 
and ethical factors and poor environmental sustainability. In Appendix D, we provide the definitions, 
descriptions, and anecdote examples we used to code these factors. Respondents recognized the role 
that Bitcoin plays in responsible innovation by giving people access to monetary systems and lowering 
transaction costs. However, interviewees acknowledged that Bitcoin has technical features that have a 
negative social impact, such as allowing people to conduct illegitimate transactions on the dark Web. This 
shows that there is a need to innovate to make transactions safer and more responsible.  
The cryptocurrency network comprises thousands of globally distributed computing nodes. To validate 
each transaction, cloud mining equipment uses a tremendous amount of electricity. As a result, many 
users feel that maintaining this financial system lacks sustainability and will hinder future adoption (i.e., the 
network spends more energy than it creates). 
4.2.8 Trust 
Trust involves the creation and fostering of relationships (Friedman et al., 2008). People trust when they 
believe other people will not harm them even when they could (Friedman et al., 2008). The factors that 
facilitate or hinder trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem include security, investment risk, risk mitigation, scams, 
stigma, volatility, irreversible transactions, and decentralization.  
A secure system’s performance characteristics include correctness, security, reliability, safety, and 
survivability (Friedman et al., 2008). If users believe a system is secure, they will trust it. Also, Bitcoin may 
mitigate investment risk. While some people view Bitcoin use as risky because government or collateral 
do not back it, other users use Bitcoin as a risk-mitigation strategy. Bitcoin’s ability to lower the risk of 
high-risk transactions constitutes an important feature (e.g., moving capital across geographic and 
economic boundaries to avoid capital controls). For example, Bitcoin can reduce the risk that a foreign 
bank will not accept currency because cryptocurrency exchanges across the world accept it. However, 
past exchange failures, such as occurred with the Mt. Gox exchange after hackers hacked it in 2011, have 
resulted in financial losses to users and harmed Bitcoin’s public image. The cryptocurrency has also 
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received significant negative publicity due to the perception that individuals primarily use it for illegal 
activity. Such incidents have damaged Bitcoin’s reputation and its users have sensed this stigma (Ingram 
Bogusz & Morisse, 2018).  
As an investment instrument, Bitcoin’s exchange rate fluctuates dramatically. Respondents expressed 
concern that Bitcoin constitutes an unsecured asset whose value depends on supply and demand in 
exchange markets. Users have no mechanism to recover money they may lose if exchanges fail or 
hackers hack their wallets. This potential for risk discouraged some respondents from using and investing 
in Bitcoin.  
Once the blockchain validates and records Bitcoin transactions, they become irreversible. This 
mechanism creates a permanent transaction record and prevents double spending and fraud in the 
payment network (Subramanian, 2017). This decentralized approach provides redundancy, safeguards 
against attacks, and minimizes the need for regulation. However, despite its advantages, respondents 
recognized that decentralized governance results in inefficient transaction processing in comparison with 
centralized transaction processing systems. 
In summary, our results illuminate the relationship between usability and human values in the Bitcoin 
ecosystem. Sometimes usability and human values support each other, but they often also lack alignment. 
For example, Bitcoin supports access, an important human value. However, though Bitcoin has wide 
accessibility, facilitates financial inclusion, and sees use across the world, its borderless qualities promote 
money laundering and ransomware and fuels the deep Web and other types of criminal activity.  Though 
Bitcoin’s laissez faire approach presents regulatory challenges, its lack of regulation facilitates “borderless 
money” in countries with collapsing economies and dictatorships. For example, in Venezuela, Bitcoin 
provides an efficient monetary system that allows citizens to convert their assets to cryptocurrency in 
order to preserve their assets’ value and purchase basic necessities such as food, which saves many 
lives (Hernandez, 2019). Users value Bitcoin’s efficiency and hyper-fungibility. At the same time, 
cryptocurrency exchanges impose high transaction costs to exchange Bitcoin with fiat money and other 
cryptocurrencies. Self-governance reduces costs due to no central governing body. However, self-
governance also leads to discord in the ecosystem resulting in multiple forks, chaos, and user confusion. 
Bitcoin allows users to control ownership and property rights. However, if individuals become 
incapacitated, their next of kin or colleagues cannot reach Bitcoin assets if they do not share their private 
keys (Murphy, 2019). As the Global Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union shows, 
individual privacy has become a significant concern that Bitcoin supports. However, an individual’s ability 
to hide behind wallet or mixer ID’s enables ransomware and blackmail to proliferate. With respect to 
responsible innovation, Nakamoto created Bitcoin for the public good. However, Bitcoin use has resulted 
in environmental concerns, high power consumption, and an elite group of cryptocurrency owners. Finally, 
in the Bitcoin ecosystem, trust is transferred to algorithms. Yet, because individuals often use Bitcoin for 
illicit activity, algorithmic trust is negated and Bitcoin is stigmatized, which prevents adoption. Accordingly, 
designers need to recognize the relationship between usability and human values to pursue alignment. In 
Section 5, we describe a research agenda that focuses on achieving greater alignment between usability 
and human values in designing and using cryptocurrencies. 
5 The Value-sensitive Design Framework and a Research Agenda for 
Cryptocurrencies 
Friedman, Kahn and Borning (2008) recommend identifying opposing values (i.e., harms and benefits) as 
part of the VSD methodology. The IS literature has long recognized technology’s dual and paradoxical 
outcomes (Robey & Boudreau, 1999). Many technologies perform in successful, perverse, and 
paradoxical ways (Deng et al. 2016). Researchers have found technologies that simultaneously cause 
harm (i.e., challenges for adopters) and benefits for various actors, such as individual users (Jarvenpaa & 
Lang, 2006) and mobile network users (Arnold, 2003), and in various contexts, such as communities 
(Harris & Weiner, 1998) and crowdsourcing (Deng et al., 2016). Our results illustrate a similar duality 
(benefits and harms/challenges) in values for each value category we identified for cryptocurrency. The 
values that Nakamoto (2008) envisioned for Bitcoin and the actual manifested values that adopters have 
encountered have often differed. For instance, Nakamoto purposefully designed Bitcoin as a 
decentralized, secure, unregulated, transparent, trust-free, and pseudo-anonymous ecosystem 
(Nakamoto, 2008). However, these features also cause negative consequences such as illegal use, high 
transaction costs, and volatility due to speculation. By ameliorating these negative consequences, one 
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could possibly increase the number of individuals and organizations that adopt and use all 
cryptocurrencies. For example, Ethereum has begun trying to reduce its energy footprint by adopting an 
energy-friendly proofing mechanism.  
Next, we synthesize the value categories we discovered from our study into the following research themes 
that can guide future research in the IS domain. Table 5 maps the value categories we identified in the 
analysis to their corresponding research themes. 
Table 5. Research Themes and Corresponding Value Categories 
Research themes Value categories 
Promoting access to cryptocurrencies Access 
Reconciling needs for both privacy and surveillance Privacy 
Regulating cryptocurrencies Laissez faire, ownership, and property 
Promoting trust Trust, self-governance 
Promoting responsible innovation Responsible innovation 
Promoting efficient cryptocurrencies Efficiency 
Based on our analysis, we present the cryptocurrency value-sensitive design framework (see Figure 2). 
The innermost circle depicts Nakamoto’s (2008) intended values: privacy, ownership and property, 
decentralization, efficiency, and trust. The middle circle depicts the values that the subjects in our study 
manifested. While several subjects manifested values consistent with Nakamoto’s intended values (e.g., 
privacy, ownership and property), we also discovered newer value categories (e.g., access, laissez faire, 
responsible innovation, self-governance). This difference reveals opportunities for research and 
improvement. We suggest that these new value categories embody important criteria that might 
encourage users to adopt. To build on the original values and to capitalize on the opportunities in the new 
values we identified, we created six key research themes to highlight research areas that can inform 
researchers in the future. The outside circle depicts these research themes. The research themes include 
promoting access to cryptocurrency, reconciling privacy with surveillance, promoting responsible 
innovation, regulating cryptocurrencies, promoting trust, and promoting efficient cryptocurrencies. We 
depict value categories and their related research themes with the same colors. Next, we develop a 
cryptocurrency research agenda based on the framework in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Cryptocurrency Value-sensitive Design Framework 
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5.1 Developing a Cryptocurrency Research Agenda  
As the final step in our VSD approach, we developed a research agenda for cryptocurrency design, 
adoption, and usage based on the above analysis. We first group the value categories that we identified 
into six research topics: 1) promoting access to cryptocurrencies, 2) reconciling need for privacy with need 
for surveillance, 3) regulating cryptocurrencies, 4) building efficient cryptocurrencies, 5) promoting 
responsible innovation in the cryptocurrency ecosystem, and 6) building a trustworthy cryptocurrency 
ecosystem. To validate this grouping externally, we had three doctoral candidates validate our 
categorization. We provide details about the external validity tests in Appendix C. Next, we pose questions 
that ask how IS research can contribute to each underlying theme. The following examples represent 
some IS research opportunities. Note that many research suggestions we make build on overlapping and 
sometimes paradoxical underlying values.  
5.1.1 Promoting Access to Cryptocurrencies  
Bitcoin has spread partly due to its including transactions and individuals that the banking and/or credit 
system does not service. However, at a basic level, existing ecommerce infrastructure has a limited ability 
to facilitate cryptocurrency transactions, which constrains cryptocurrencies from growing and individuals 
from accessing it for everyday purchases. Users also find it difficult to understand how to invest in 
cryptocurrencies and how to use them to buy and sell products and services. Therefore, research and 
innovation efforts must not only evaluate the effectiveness of solutions that leverage cryptocurrency 
technology but also propose more user-friendly solutions.   
A pertinent question concerns how we can promote disadvantaged people to adopt and use blockchain 
technologies. This important research question can inform scholars who can choose to perform studies in 
which they compare adoption among citizens in developed and developing countries and test their theory 
using models such as the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and unified theory of 
acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). 
Blockchain facilitates trustworthy transactions across geographic, economic, and social boundaries. As 
such, it can provide individuals with access to a wider social network due to the trust occurring on multiple 
dimen. For example, Dunbar’s (1992, 2002) number—a principle that posits an individual’s optimal social 
group size to be 150—demonstrates that the brain’s human neocortex, not ecological or environmental 
factors, limit an individual’s social group size. However, by using the blockchain, individuals can surpass 
this limit because they lower ecological barriers to trust due to the way blockchain innovations such as 
smart contract applications and messaging platforms distribute trust. These innovations provide the 
means with which individuals can increase their social group size, social scalability, and network effects.  
Precisely how blockchain applications such as cryptocurrencies may lead to social scalability represents a 
promising research area. For instance, scholars could investigate how cryptocurrencies enable social 
scalability by breaking Dunbar’s number. To study this question, scholars could investigate Bitcoin 
transactions by using data from Bitcoin’s or Ethereum’s smart contract applications such as Cryptokitties, 
or by using other means such as social network analyses. Researchers could analyze blockchain data 
from messaging platforms such as Telegram and Kik to understand factors such as a user’s social 
network’s social reach and the scalability when platforms issue cryptocurrency tokens to their users. 
Researchers have already conducted some such studies in computer science and sociology to analyze 
the effect that Twitter has on Dunbar’s number (Gonçalves, Perra, & Vespignani, 2011).  
If IS researchers more commonly studied the evolving landscape of cryptocurrency applications, we could 
develop new theoretical understandings about how to promote organizations to adopt and use 
cryptocurrencies in their point-of-sale systems and electronic funds transfer systems. Such an 
investigation might entail studying consumer behavior at ATMs that support cryptocurrency and point-of-
sale systems such as BitPay. By qualitatively investigating why consumers adopt Bitcoin at these places, 
scholars could better understand the advantages in using such systems. Similarly, newer business 
models such as Purse.io that encourage users to barter Bitcoin for goods on ecommerce sites could 
enable researchers to delve into the socioeconomic factors that lead to cryptocurrency adoption across 
society. Table 6 proposes research opportunities that promote access to cryptocurrencies. 
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Table 6. Research Opportunities to Promote Access to Cryptocurrencies 
Value 
category 
Theoretical question Empirical context 
Access 
How can one promote cryptocurrency 
adoption and use among people who 
find cryptocurrencies difficult to use? 
Study developing countries that adopt any form of 
cryptocurrency using theoretical models such as TAM and 
UTAUT. 
How can cryptocurrencies enable social 
scalability and how does it affect 
Dunbar’s number? 
Study social scalability using Bitcoin interactions (e.g., using 
data from Bitcoin’s or Ethereum-based smart contract 
applications such as Cryptokitties). Analyze social reach and 
scale of messaging platforms such as Telegram and Kik that 
issue tokens. 
How can one promote organizations to 
adopt cryptocurrencies in their point-of-
sale systems and electronic funds 
transfer systems? 
Study various business models such as bartering on Purse.io to 
use Bitcoin for ecommerce purchases. 
What impact do decentralized 
blockchain-based applications have on 
supply and service chains? 
Study relevant business models such as how decentralized 
applications such as Fizzy and Etherisc have disrupted 
insurance markets. 
5.1.2 Reconciling the Need for Privacy with the Need for Surveillance 
Bitcoin exists in a state of tension between anonymity and traceability (Ballis, 2017). Computer science 
researchers have conducted most prior research on these cryptocurrency issues, though researchers 
have not yet considered the sociotechnical implications. From a technical standpoint, though Bitcoin lacks 
full anonymity, prior research confirms that several services anonymize transactions in the Bitcoin 
ecosystem with some success (Möser et al, 2013), such as Bitcoin mixer BitLaundry. Admittedly, 
individuals often use Bitcoin mixers for money laundering and other criminal activities, but transaction 
anonymization has many legitimate purposes as well. For example, it would benefit the healthcare 
industry since many donors have a legitimate interest in maintaining their financial privacy. Moreover, 
Bitcoin mixers can provide transaction anonymity by directing all transactions through a single trustworthy 
service and disguising incoming and outgoing transactions (Möser et al., 2013). A service can provide 
more anonymity if a large number of independent users uses the service. With that said, Bitcoin mixers do 
come with security risks: untrustworthy mixers have traced or stolen coins (Sasson et al., 2014).  
One can also assure privacy in cryptocurrency transactions by developing new services with privacy built 
into the design (Ballis, 2017), such as Zerocash, an alternative cryptocurrency that used cutting-edge 
cryptography to hide all information from the blockchain except for transactions’ existence. Based on this 
mechanism, each transaction included a cryptographic, publicly verifiable proof of its own validity (Sasson 
et al., 2014). On this basis, research scholars could investigate how one could build user-verifiable 
transaction anonymizers with provable anonymity and security guarantees. They could also investigate 
how to deter individuals from using transaction anonymizers for money laundering and other criminal 
activity. Researchers may execute these studies by using cryptocurrency exchange data or mixer-related 
data for cryptocurrency trade or transfer (e.g., data from Kraken, Coinbase, Robinhood, or Bithumb) to 
analyze users’ behaviors with respect to transaction anonymizers. One can use taint analysis tools to, for 
instance, evaluate how much anonymity a service can provide (Möser et al., 2013). However, researchers 
need to develop more accurate and reliable evaluation tools. To enable one to trace transactions, 
researchers could use advanced transaction graph-analysis techniques to analyze the blockchain to 
reveal cash flow and other financial details (Ballis, 2017).  
Specific issues surrounding transactions’ privacy and traceability arise when governments become 
involved in issuing cryptocurrencies. Several governments have considered either replacing their existing 
fiat currency with a cryptocurrency equivalent or issuing a new cryptocurrency (such as Petrocoin in 
Venezuela) to increase liquidity in their financial systems. In cases where organizations enforce central 
control and the acquirers may be disclosed, we need to examine how users, issuers, and other 
participants in the ecosystem may change. Scholars have also analyzed the conflict between privacy and 
surveillance in modern nation states (Neyland, 2006; Stanton & Stam, 2006). However, scholars need to 
study how removing transaction privacy in the cryptocurrency ecosystem affects user adoption and use, 
which they can do by conducting case studies on privately issued initial coin offers (ICOs) or firm-
controlled coins (JioCoin). 
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Generally speaking, blockchain transaction confidentiality is critical for governments, enterprises, and 
individuals—a sociotechnical issue that will affect adoption decisions. Therefore, we need more work that 
examines how to balance privacy needs with the extent to which one can trace transactions to personally 
identifiable information. Researchers can investigate the possible legal mechanisms for cryptocurrency 
users to ensure that cryptocurrencies maintain privacy while preventing illegal use. They can combine 
digital forensic techniques, such as tracing Internet protocol (IP) addresses or mining logs, with 
transaction analysis and graph theoretical construction to identify loops and other structures that can 
identify mixing, money laundering, and currency-exchange manipulation. Such studies can prevent illegal 
use and assist law enforcement in detecting fraud and enforcing legitimacy. We highlight the potential 
research opportunities related to reconciling needs for privacy with needs for surveillance in Table 7. 
Table 7. Research Opportunities in Reconciling Needs for Privacy with Needs for Surveillance 
Value category Theoretical question Empirical context 
Privacy 
How can one build user-verifiable transaction 
anonymizers with provable anonymity and 
security guarantees? 
One can use exchange data or mixer-related 
data to trade and transfer information (e.g., data 
from Kraken, Coinbase, Robinhood, or 
Bithumb). 
How can one deter individuals from using 
transaction anonymizers for money laundering 
and other criminal activity? 
What impact does removing transaction privacy 
in the cryptocurrency ecosystem have on user 
adoption and use? 
One can use live case studies for privately 
issued ICO or firm-controlled coins (e.g., 
JioCoin, Petrocoin, Augur). 
What legal mechanisms can one offer to 
cryptocurrency users to ensure that 
cryptocurrencies maintain their privacy while 
preventing them from using it for illegal 
purposes? 
One can measure privacy as specified by a 
cryptocurrency. To do so, one can use a 
combination of digital forensic techniques, such 
as tracing IP addresses and accessing 
information from exchanges. 
5.1.3 Regulating Cryptocurrencies 
A lack of regulatory harmonization impedes efforts to regulate global cryptocurrency (Harasic, 2014). The 
United States treats Bitcoin ownership similarly to share and equity ownership. Given this trend, U.S. 
Government agencies have begun attempting to regulate these new currencies. While such regulations 
remain limited, U.S. agencies including the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have exerted jurisdiction over Bitcoin. For instance, before its failure, 
Mt. Gox had to register with FinCEN because U.S. agencies considered it a money transmitter. Some 
U.S. courts have also ruled that Bitcoin constitutes money. Some may also view Bitcoin transactions as 
investment contracts equivalent to securities that SEC law governs in some types of transactions such as 
ICOs. The IRS considers bitcoins taxable property, and the CFTC considers Bitcoin a commodity. 
However, regulators still have limited powers over cryptocurrencies. As such, the SEC has warned that 
investors should “exercise caution” with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and noted that state and federal 
regulators may not be able to recoup any lost investments from illegal actors (Schroeder, 2018).  
Other countries such as India treat Bitcoin ownership as similar to real estate. Bitcoin adoption has been 
slow in India. Though the Reserve Bank of India has endorsed blockchain technology, it has not yet 
endorsed cryptocurrencies. Japan’s cabinet has officially recognized virtual currencies, including Bitcoin, 
as real money. The Chinese Government has sought to impose restrictions on Chinese citizens’ 
investments in Bitcoin, but its manipulation of its currency has recently led to large Bitcoin trading as an 
alternative investment strategy. Despite its restrictions, China produces the most bitcoins in the world. 
Thus, the country represents a powerful force because, collectively, Chinese miners can reject any new 
improvements to the Bitcoin protocol.  
Therefore, researchers could study what rules or regulations should governments impose on exchanges, 
traders, and systems to prevent individuals from illegally using Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. Such a 
question could involve studying legal frameworks in existing countries and jurisdictions and comparing the 
outcomes of such legal frameworks in enabling the cryptocurrency economy to grow without causing 
disruptions to social order.  
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The dissimilar approaches world governments now use to regulate cryptocurrencies affect the tax rates 
they impose on selling cryptocurrencies and how they monitor the global flow of cryptocurrency 
movement. Though different governments’ disparate regulatory efforts have stemmed some problems in 
the cryptocurrency ecosystem, they have also demonstrated that governments do not fully understand 
and lack the preparation to deal with cryptocurrencies.  
U.S. legal scholars have proposed regulatory solutions to the challenges that cryptocurrencies present, 
such as regulations that make assurances similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
protections for bank depositors to mitigate users’ losses in hacking situations (McLeod, 2017). However, 
this approach would break the pseudo-anonymity that cryptocurrencies currently provide because 
implementing it would require some type of identification. Legal scholars have also focused on regulating 
Bitcoin under a “quasi-security” framework with its own regulatory legislation (Harasic, 2014).  
The U.S. Government released tax regulations for Bitcoin in 2014 in the form of IRS Notice 2014-21. 
Accordingly, investigating how governments should treat cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency trade for 
taxation purposes represents a pertinent research question that would require collaboration between legal 
and IS scholars.  
From a technical perspective, transaction anonymization presents regulatory issues and increases 
cryptocurrencies’ susceptibility to criminal use. One solution involves enforcing know-your-customer (KYC) 
procedures at the edges of the cryptocurrency system, where individuals exchange cryptocurrencies for 
conventional currencies or products and services. Researchers could investigate how to create KYC 
approaches that preserve privacy and deter illegal Bitcoin use. Researchers could also investigate how to 
identify suspicious activities in the blockchain and hold perpetrators accountable for their real-world 
transactions (Möser et al., 2013). Other regulatory strategies include blacklisting suspicious transactions 
or account holders. Governments could legally mandate entities that operate in the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to observe official transaction blacklists. A promising research direction could involve 
investigating how to develop data-mining or artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to blacklist suspicious 
transactions and account holders.  
Globally, conflicting views on the impact of regulating cryptocurrencies exist. Predominant views indicate 
that regulations will either protect legitimate users or fall flat by creating inefficiencies that produce no 
measurable success. Therefore, future research can examine how to regulate national cryptocurrencies. 
Such research could include analyzing different legal frameworks for cryptocurrency across the world. 
Moreover, IS scholars could examine and contribute to formulating policy frameworks by actively working 
with members in the legal community who work in contract law, criminal law, civil litigation, and forensic 
law. Table 8 summarizes potential research opportunities in regulating cryptocurrencies. 
Table 8. Research Opportunities in Regulating Cryptocurrencies 
Value category Theoretical question Empirical context 
Laissez faire 
How should governments treat cryptocurrencies and 
cryptocurrency trade for taxation purposes?  
Study how different tax laws affect how 
individuals use cryptocurrencies. 
What rules or regulations should governments 
impose on exchanges, traders, and systems? 
Consider how Bitcoin, cryptocurrency 
exchanges, and existing legal mechanisms 
handle similar assets. 
How can one create KYC approaches that preserve 
privacy and deter individuals from using Bitcoin for 
illegal purposes? 
Bitcoin/cryptocurrency exchanges; 
research of user behavior. 
How can one blacklist suspicious transaction 
histories and account holders? 
Blockchain forensics: pursue the ability to 
trace blockchain transactions using graph 
theoretic and other techniques. 
How will banks, exchanges, and other 
intermediaries that users trust guarantee a 
cryptocurrency’s value? 
Study private insurance based on hedge 
funds, banks, exchanges, or other 
intermediaries. 
Ownership and 
property 
How can governments regulate firm-controlled or 
government-controlled cryptocurrencies? 
Study cryptocurrencies such as Petrocoin, 
which the Venezuelan Government issues, 
and its effects on the global economy. 
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5.1.4 Promoting Efficient Cryptocurrencies 
Blockchain technology offers a distributed software architecture (Xu et al., 2016) that enables transparent, 
secure, and tamper-free data transaction records with no central failure point. Nevertheless, blockchain 
systems still represent an emergent technology and exhibit various problems that we need to solve. For 
instance, efficiency and scalability issues related to security, network size, limited transaction loads, and 
high computational costs continue to pose problems. 
Therefore, a need to balance blockchain’s security features with the cryptocurrency ecosystem’s efficiency 
exists. Consequently, researchers could examine how one could make blockchain and other underlying 
technologies for cryptocurrencies more scalable, secure, and cost effective. To investigate this research 
question, IS scholars would do well to study complex software systems’ architecture and propose design 
mechanisms for scalability. Such an approach could involve conducting research on how to better design 
distributed databases and distributed computing. The Ethereum project has begun prototyping multiple 
solutions to address energy efficiency through 1) rolling out proof-of-stake mechanisms that will reduce 
the energy requirements for validating transactions and 2) implementing scalability through sharding 
mechanisms that increase transaction throughput to market levels.  
Transaction costs play an important role in improving the marketing system’s efficiency. If higher than the 
actual transaction value, transaction costs may discourage cryptocurrency use. Markets determine 
transaction costs because they compensate miners for performing complex mining tasks. Transaction 
fees can increase based on increased workload since nodes in the network write more data onto chains 
during high-demand periods. Miners who confirm transactions may choose to ignore transactions that 
offer lower fees. As a result, transactions may remain unconfirmed for a long time. Therefore, we need 
understand mechanisms that determine transaction costs. Accordingly, scholars could study what 
behavioral or technical modifications one could make in cryptocurrency ecosystems to reduce transaction 
costs. They could also study the economics of decentralized systems’ design and model such systems 
analytically to simulate various scenarios. Based on the abovementioned concepts, we list the research 
issues related to promoting efficient cryptocurrencies in Table 9. 
Table 9. Research Opportunities in Promoting Efficient Cryptocurrencies 
Value category Theoretical question Empirical context 
Efficiency 
How can one make the blockchain 
technologies that underlie cryptocurrencies 
more scalable, secure, and cost effective? 
Employ database design concepts such as sharding 
and distributed computation to solve scalability 
challenges. 
What behavioral or technical modifications 
can one make in ecosystems to reduce 
transaction costs? 
Study transaction characteristics of Bitcoin and 
Ethereum protocols to analyze supply-demand 
characteristics and the role transaction costs play in 
them. 
5.1.5 Promoting Responsible Innovation in the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem 
We mention two key worthy research issues that fall under the responsible innovation umbrella. The first 
issue concerns the idea of environmentally sustainable cryptocurrencies. The IS research community has 
long acknowledged that green IS initiatives could considerably improve poor environmental practices. 
Researchers have actually proposed energy informatics as an IS subdiscipline (Watson, Boudreau, & 
Chen, 2010). Energy informatics involves analyzing, designing, and implementing systems to increase the 
efficiency of energy demand and supply systems (Watson et al., 2010). This approach requires scholars 
to collect and analyze energy data sets to better optimize energy distribution and consumption networks. 
Along these lines, many studies outside of the IS discipline have examined cryptocurrencies’ sustainability 
with conflicting results. Currently, the cryptocurrency ecosystem consumes enormous amounts of power 
on mining cryptocurrencies. Based on energy consumption alone, some studies suggest that paper 
money, goods, and banking systems have higher environmental costs than Bitcoin (Giungato, Rana, & 
Tarabella, & Tricase, 2017; McCook, 2015). One study notes that Bitcoin’s energy consumption exceeds 
the electricity that Ireland consumes (O’Dwyer & Malone, 2014). Admittedly, depending on 
cryptocurrencies’ exchange rate, the energy that mining consumes may exceed its rewards. Research 
posits that, should the entire monetary system transition to cryptocurrency, maintaining the system would 
consume an excessive amount of energy (Giungato et al., 2017). For such reasons, cryptocurrencies’ 
prospective energy demands may constrain the cryptocurrency ecosystem and new innovative application 
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stream from evolving. Still, creating sustainable cryptocurrency applications and developing novel ways to 
use IS to manage the energy footprint constitute promising research avenues.  
Cryptocurrencies’ energy requirements seriously threaten their viability; as a result, scholars need to 
research sustainability and provide solutions to this issue. Scholars could examine how one can use 
different information systems to reduce the energy footprint of various parts of the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem. Empirically, scholars should device measures and monitor the energy footprint for each 
component of the ecosystem (e.g., mining algorithms, network nodes, transmission relays, etc.) to 
estimate the total energy the ecosystem consumes. They could predict and postulate the viability of such 
systems and suggest research methods to improve their sustainability. Scholars could also develop 
innovations for the public good. In particular, developing innovative solutions for the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged as we describe in Section 5.1 also represents a form of responsible innovation that falls 
under the social sustainability umbrella.  
Table 10 highlights the potential research opportunities in promoting responsible innovation in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
Table 10. Research Opportunities in Promoting Responsible Innovation of the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem 
Value category Theoretical question Empirical context 
Responsible innovation 
How can IS reduce the energy footprint 
of various parts of the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem (i.e., miners and nodes)? 
Modify cryptocurrency mining algorithms to suit 
other modes (e.g., proof of stake) to reduce 
power consumption. 
5.1.6 Promoting Trust in the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem 
Among their advantages, cryptocurrencies transfer trust from an individual to a network of distributed 
system nodes that operate without interference. But, trust issues do exist in the open source community 
responsible for developing cryptocurrencies. These trust issues may lead to a research stream related to 
this community’s self-governance. Many IS scholars have studied open source software-development 
practices (Roberts et al., 2006). However, they have conducted their studies mostly in contexts related to 
freely distributed software for public use (e.g., Mozilla Foundation projects, Linux core development, the 
MIT-X open consortium). Scholars have studied incentives, motivational factors, and developer 
contributions in this space. However, with cryptocurrency, executable software code that software 
developers control and manage has come to bear economic value. The financial and economic impacts of 
Blockchain software implementations have the potential to cause conflicts of interest among actors across 
the ecosystem.  
To preserve the original values behind Bitcoin and overcome present challenges, the cryptocurrency 
community, which includes miners, developers, users, node operators, exchanges, and application 
developers, must agree on important decisions such as source code updates. Predictably, mining 
companies would prefer not to have frequent source code updates or rollouts, which would disrupt their 
earning potential. In the past, disagreement on approaches to scaling the Bitcoin blockchain in the 
community has stalled two performance updates. When differences become irreconcilable, developers 
sometimes create two versions of the core software with minor modifications through a process known as 
forking, which creates a sister token on the network. In turn, such forks can erode the parent coin’s value. 
For example, Bitcoin recently forked into Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin Main, two competing tokens with 
different blockchains and technical standards.  
Overall, open source development on the blockchain has significant implications for earning potential that 
also introduce potential conflicts with social welfare. To mitigate potential controversy, each innovative 
initiative should consider all stakeholders’ views in order to increase the social welfare of all participants in 
the network. Arriving at an optimal solution that benefits all stakeholders requires strong leadership and 
effective governance mechanisms.  
Therefore, consider the following research question: how can the open source community create a 
governance framework with multiple stakeholders to support major initiatives? To answer such a question, 
scholars need to model and empirically measure different stakeholders’ incentives, which often conflict. 
For example, miners have an incentive to retain the same source code version, whereas developers and 
traders have an incentive to move to a more efficient code base.  
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Among their attractive features, any financial institution or mechanism provides security to their end users. 
However, IS research about security mainly focuses on issues that one cannot easily apply to the Bitcoin 
ecosystem, such as computer abuse in organizations (Straub & Nance, 1990), security compliance 
(Smith, Winchester, Bunker, & Jamieson, 2010), and executives’ perspectives on security management 
(Loch, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992). To supplement these perspectives, prior research about security issues 
in the Bitcoin ecosystem has focused on identifying Bitcoin’s main characteristics, such as 
decentralization, deregulation, embedded expertise, reputation, transactions’ transparency, low cost, and 
their impacts on trust (Sas & Khairuddin, 2017).  
Smart contracts—agreements between two or more parties that blockchain programs automatically 
enforce without an intermediary—have become a popular topic in cryptocurrency research recently (Ballis, 
2017). Two of the most popular cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, allow users to create smart 
contracts. A smart contract can encode any set of rules represented in its programming language. But, 
regardless of platform, smart contracts have security vulnerabilities. Smart contract platforms operate in 
open (or permission-less) networks where arbitrary participants can participate, which makes these 
contracts vulnerable to manipulation from, for example, miners and contract users (Luu, Chu, Olickel, 
Saxena, & Hobor, 2016). For example, Ethereum and Bitcoin allow miners to decide which transactions to 
accept, how to order transactions, and to set the block timestamp, which makes transactions open to 
manipulation. Research has previously examined how to eliminate bugs from smart contracts (Luu et al., 
2016). Nevertheless, smart contracts can implement a wide range of applications (e.g., financial 
instruments, money transfers, savings wallets, wills, outsourced computations, and decentralized 
gambling), which offers many research possibilities. IS scholars could study how we can measure trust, 
monitor trust, and improve trust between different stakeholders in a self-governing techno-financial 
system. Further, they could examine whether the many stakeholders in the ecosystem, such as miners, 
developers, evangelists, consumers, and coin accepters, perceive systemic trust. 
Not all individuals trust cryptocurrencies; thus, scholars have room to conduct research initiatives that 
focus on devising better approaches for assuring individuals trust the blockchain. The blockchain creates 
a trust-free environment by replacing governing institutions or interpersonal trust with cryptographic 
protocols and decentralized consensus algorithms (Notheisen et al., 2017). Thus, humans have 
increasingly needed to trust in algorithms rather than traditional institutions (Lustig & Nardi, 2015). Studies 
on algorithmic trust in the Bitcoin ecosystem suggest that algorithmic trust involves not only trust in the 
algorithm to function correctly but also trust in the various sociotechnical factors in the Bitcoin ecosystem 
scholars have yet to explore and understand (Lustig & Nardi, 2015). The very concept of a trust-free 
system actually remains somewhat unclear: one could argue that trust would shift from central institutions 
or market authorities to algorithms (Notheisen et al., 2017). If so, how reliable are algorithmic forms of 
trust when replacing other forms of transactions, such as those between firms and individuals or between 
individuals and institutions? Table 11 organizes research opportunities for promoting trust in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
Table 11. Research Opportunities for Promoting Trust in the Cryptocurrency Ecosystem 
Value category Theoretical question Empirical context 
Trust 
 
How can one measure, improve, and 
monitor different stakeholders’ trust in self-
governing open source systems? 
By assessing Bitcoin’s ecosystem as comprising 
miners, developers, activists, etc. 
How effective are algorithmic forms of trust? 
One can measure trust when one removes the 
intermediary from the picture (e.g., using smart 
contracts). One can validate smart contracts and their 
impact on existing contracts and businesses. 
Self-governance 
How can the open source community create 
a governance framework with multiple 
stakeholders with different incentives to 
support major initiatives? 
Study core teams’ open source development policy 
and miners’, nodes’, and others’ incentives to adopt 
changes that benefit users without compromising 
security that the network rolls out. A game theoretic 
analysis of the stakes of different actors in the 
ecosystem might uncover strategies to arrive at an 
equilibrium that benefits all actors. 
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6 Limitations 
As with any study, ours has several limitations. First, we acknowledge that, while we used students and 
working professionals as respondents in our study, some did not fully know about Bitcoin’s features and 
could have responded without well-founded knowledge. However, our study also included experts and 
individuals who adopted the technology early on, which provides a more balanced view. Second, our 
value-sensitive design approach applied an individual adoption perspective and not a business enterprise 
perspective. Future studies could extend our study by exploring cryptocurrencies’ benefits and 
disadvantages from an enterprise viewpoint. Finally, since most our respondents (about 90 percent) lived 
in the United States, cultural differences could have affected perspectives about the values. That being 
said, many (about 60 percent) were born in another country. Future research could extend this study to 
other cultures that either accept cryptocurrencies more (e.g. countries in the European Union) or less 
(e.g., India or China). Despite these limitations, this study contributes to more systematically explaining 
cryptocurrencies’ benefits and harms from the individual perspective since it builds on grounded analytical 
techniques applied to VSD principles. We believe our study provides a strong foundation for future 
research on related cryptocurrency topics. 
7 Conclusion 
We found that individuals have varied values about Bitcoin and extended the values of the 
cryptocurrency’s original designers. Accordingly, we developed an IS research agenda to focus on next-
generation cryptocurrency innovations that leverage democratic, decentralized public ledgers. The 
research agenda can add value to people and organizations and provide socioeconomic benefits to 
disadvantaged communities. As such, our research agenda considers cryptocurrency’s benefits and 
harms (challenges) and suggests further research to understand the implications of these manifested 
values.  
While IS researchers initially received encouragement to leverage theories from emerging research in 
other disciplines, they must also contribute to this expanding knowledge base by offering a specifically IS 
perspective. We hope this paper leads IS researchers to become prolific contributors by building on 
existing knowledge in the discipline and adding to the growing literature on cryptocurrencies. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaires 
Table A1. Focus Group Questions to 12 Meetup Group Members 
ID Question 
1 What cryptocurrencies do you use? 
2 Why would you use this cryptocurrency compared to the others? 
3 How would you compare one cryptocurrency to another? 
4 What advantages does Bitcoin have over other types of currency? 
5 What do you use Bitcoin for? 
6 What, in your opinion, if at all, would cause Bitcoin (and other cryptocurrencies) to fail? 
7 What do you do for a living, and can you describe your work? 
8 How does that have a bearing on the use of cryptocurrencies? 
9 Do you have any stories about your Bitcoin involvement? 
10 Any disadvantages you could think of—with Bitcoin and its investment community? 
 
Table A2. Questions Posed to 110 Survey Participants 
ID Question 
1 What do you know about Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies? 
2 If you know about Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies, do you hold any of it? 
3 Are you aware of any of the uses of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies?  
4 Have you or your friends used Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency? 
5 What do you think are some of the risks of owning Bitcoin?  
6 In the future, do you think you will own Bitcoin or any of the other cryptocurrencies? 
7 In your opinion, what are some of the risks that people who own Bitcoin bear? 
8 If you don’t own Bitcoin or any cryptocurrencies, why is it that you don’t own it? 
 
Table A3. Additional Questions Posed to 41 Bitcoin Stakeholders* 
ID Question 
1 Briefly describe your role in the cryptocurrency ecosystem and how important that is to your daily job? 
2 What are some of the privacy or legal concerns with adopting or using cryptocurrencies? 
3 What challenges do you foresee for Bitcoin and/or other cryptocurrencies in future? 
* We also posed these addition three questions to an additional 41 stakeholders. 
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Appendix B: Demographics of the Survey Population 
Phase One 
Phase one involved 12 male full-time professionals between 25 and 42 years old. They earned between 
US$50,000 and $150,000 per annum. 
Phase Two 
Table B1. Phase Two Survey Population Demographics (N = 110) 
Age Employment status Country of origin 
   
Gender: 55% male, 45% female; annual income ranged between US$0 and $65,000; 80% of respondents did not use cryptocurrency. 
Phase Three 
Table B2. Phase Three Survey Population Demographics (N = 41) 
Age distribution Employment status Country of origin distribution 
  
 
Gender: 80% male, 20% female; employment status: all full time employed. 
Phase three survey population owned the following cryptocurrencies (abbreviations from coinmarketcap.com): BAT, PPY, PundiX, 
Xinfin, XMR, BNB, BTC, Cardano, Decred, DIE, DIG, Digibyte, EOS, Kin, BTCash, ontology, Ripple, Tron, Ethereum. 
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Appendix C: Data Analysis Using Grounded Theory Analytical 
Approaches 
Coding constitutes the most basic and the most fundamental process in grounded theory development. 
We first collected the data by interviewing subjects based on questions in Appendix A. We then imported 
the transcriptions for the recorded interviews and email interviews into NVIVO 11. Using NVIVO, the 
coders coded line-by-line, sentence-by-sentence, paragraph-by-paragraph, page-by-page, and section-
by-section. The smaller the unit of analysis, the more numerous the descriptive categories that initially 
emerged. Line-by-line analysis ensured that we “grounded” our analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
Open Coding 
Open coding involved developing several low-level codes for the benefits and harms of using Bitcoin (106 
to be exact). Two coders then independently developed agreement metrics for these codes. If the inter-
rater reliability (IRR) metric and Cohen’s kappa metric did not reach 75 percent and 0.75, respectively, 
they repeated this step until they reached an acceptable agreement level. Once the coders finalized the 
coding schema with these metrics, they proceeded to independently code the other data (110 student 
email interviews and 41 expert interviews). At the end of open coding, we obtained an IRR over 75 
percent and a Cohen’s kappa over 0.75.  
Axial Coding 
We then combined the open codes to form higher-level codes that represented values in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. For example, to derive the code “security”, we combined open codes for 
secure transactions, unhackable, and so on under the “security” axial code. The coding paradigm we used 
clearly defined interactions among the open codes. For example, in the value-sensitive design approach 
for the three open codes we mention above, we asked the question: “What codes indicate increased 
“trust” for Bitcoin adopters?”. We defined this higher level “trust” code with examples (or annotations from 
our interview) and formed our value category. While some open codes formed the core of the “trust” value 
category (e.g., “security”, “stigma”, etc.), others such as “secure transaction support”, “negative image”, 
and so on formed peripheral descriptive codes that we categorized as subcodes. We present the axial 
codes as “value categories” in Table 2. Further, we shared the definitions for each open code and the 
axial codes with external scholars (doctoral students) who validated the content by independently 
categorizing the open codes into axial codes. We then calculated the IRR. If the IRR did not reach 75 
percent, we proceeded to distill and combine a few more open codes with existing ones until the doctoral 
students obtained an IRR greater than 75 percent. To reconcile differences, we often conducted a brief 
meeting to resolve differences. Next, we categorized the axial codes into selective codes. 
Selective Codes 
We combined the axial further to form higher-level codes known as selective coding to create “research 
themes”. Much past IS research that has used the VSD approach has focused on providing future 
directions to scholars, practitioners, and designers based on analyzing existing values underlying IS 
usage (Deng et al., 2016). In the manuscript, we present the selective codes as “research themes” based 
on the “axial codes” (value categories) (see Table 2).  
External Content Validity Tests and Iteration 
Once we completed the coding schema and categorization (i.e., values -> value categories -> research 
themes), we asked three doctoral candidates to independently use a q-sorting process to validate the 
categorization. The content validity tests showed an IRR of 69 percent in the first iteration. We 
subsequently refined the coding, definitions, and categorizations. The doctoral candidates conducted the 
q-sorting process a second time, which resulted in an inter-coder reliability close to 90 percent. Below, we 
represent schematically the research method we followed in our study. 
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Figure C1. Research Method 
 
  
Phase one (n = 12) 
 
Focus group study (the meetup group) to 
determine why current Bitcoin users used 
Bitcoin and what challenges they faced 
Base coding schema: 
 
Open codes (benefits & harms) 
  
Axial codes (value categories) 
  
Selective codes (research themes) 
Check 
IRR and 
iterate   
Consolidating codes across the three phases and conducting 
external validity tests. 
Iterating by updating the coding schema until IRR exceeds 
75%. 
Phase two (n = 110) 
 
Email interviews with 110 randomly chosen 
students enrolled in the evening MBA and BBA 
programs at a large university in the southern 
United States to understand Bitcoin’s potential 
benefits and challenge 
Apply coding schema and update: 
 
Open codes (benefits & harms) 
  
Axial codes (value categories) 
  
Selective codes (research themes)  
Phase three (n= 41)  
 
Interview with bitcoin key stakeholders to 
understand the stakeholder’s perspectives and 
expectations (such as miners, investors, 
application developers, media participants, in 
the cryptocurrency community) 
Discovery of new codes: 
 
Open codes (benefits & harms) 
  
Axial codes (value categories) 
  
Selective codes (research themes)  
Check 
IRR and 
iterate   
Check 
IRR and 
iterate   
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Appendix D: Quotes and Definitions of Value Categories 
Table D1. Access  
Value 
(benefit/harms ) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Democratization of 
money 
(benefit) 
The act of making money accessible to 
everyone by making everyone a stakeholder.  
Democratization also means that individuals 
believe they have a stake in how much 
money is available and printed—a facet of 
the algorithm that mines and releases Bitcoin 
into the network. 
“Bitcoin is for the underserviced. It is for people 
who don’t have bank accounts, what you are 
trying to do in a lot of ways is provide access to 
the underserviced.” 
 
Financial inclusion 
(benefit) 
Including people whom the formal financial 
system currently excludes. 
“It’s for an economy which is not being serviced by 
other technologies.” 
Global acceptance 
(benefit) 
Universal currency accepted globally without 
conversion effects.  
“Immigrants send a lot of money overseas, and 
Bitcoin can reduce their fees and time to send and 
receive.” 
“Someone in Saudi Arabia can send me a dollar 
and fifty cents. For me that is one of the uses.”  
Usefulness 
(benefit) 
A technology property that allows one to use 
the technology or coin for multiple purposes. 
“I use it for sending money to children, who are in 
college.” 
”To create an anonymous way to purchase almost 
anything on the World Wide Web.” 
“Profit potential, tax protection, prestige/cool 
value, Crypto allows a constant value for a 
medium of exchange outside of government 
oversight. Ultimate tax shelter.” 
Low network 
effects (harm) 
A phenomenon whereby a product or service 
gain additional value as more people use it.  
“I have used it for payment but am waiting for 
more places to accept it.” 
“There are not too many places that accept 
Bitcoin.” 
Complexity (harm) 
A technology property that makes it complex 
to understand and often filled with 
communication difficulties. 
“The technical jargon is daunting and the Satoshi 
as a unit in millions scares newbies.” 
“Bitcoin has incomprehensible tech.” 
“There needs to be a simpler understanding for 
people to use it in everyday transactions.” 
“The UI/UX for most cryptocurrencies is very 
difficult for most people to understand.” 
Difficult to use 
(harm) 
A cryptocurrency property wherein users find 
it difficult to use. 
“Bitcoin is difficult to use.”  
“How do I acquire bitcoin?” 
“I don’t understand the technology?” 
 
Table D2. Efficiency  
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Freedom from 
regulation 
(benefit) 
• Censorship 
resistant 
The overarching belief that regulatory 
oversight inhibits innovation and 
stifles business growth. Thus, 
freedom from regulation can be 
beneficial.  
“Licensing does not help the underserved. It might 
hurt the underserved or might do the opposite; most 
people don’t care (about licensing or legalities). It 
(licensing) just would prevent real businesses”.  
 
“I like crypto-currency because they are censorship 
resistant.” 
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Table D2. Efficiency  
Regulatory 
challenges 
(harm) 
• Regulatory clarity 
(crypto law) 
• Political lobbying 
 
• The difficulty of applying either 
existing or creating new regulation 
for monitoring financial 
transactions on the blockchain.  
• Includes the ability to create 
regulatory clarity and/or changes 
through political lobbying.  
“Lack of regulatory clarity especially for financial 
services.” 
 “Overall political lobbying for crypto-laws can harm 
the ecosystem.” 
 
Table D3. Efficiency  
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
High transaction 
times 
(harm) 
Network latency—high latency. 
Blockchain bloat—the blockchain stores all 
transactions historically. However, in addition 
to transaction information, users can write data 
into the record. This causes an exponential 
increase in the size of the blockchain. 
 
The time it takes to validate a transaction 
between two parties is exceedingly large 
(between 1 and 45 minutes), which does not 
allow for e-commerce or other real-time fund 
transfers. 
“Right now, the transaction fees are small—it’s [the 
blockchain] going to be a giant wall of pxxxxx 
[irrelevant content such as comments, images, 
etc.].” “You can write stuff into transactions; i.e., 
there is no incentive to NOT write pxxxxx onto the 
blockchain.” 
“Transaction times are getting unmanageable.” 
High transaction 
costs 
(harm) 
High transaction costs increase barriers to 
entry. 
“The tollbooths (the transaction fees paid to third 
parties when Bitcoin is exchanged for fiat 
currencies at ATMs or at physical locations) are 
expensive; sometimes it is 12.5% and 15%.” 
Hyper-fungible 
(benefit) 
Easily exchangeable or replaceable with other 
currencies in comparison to other regulated 
fiat currencies.  
“It is so fungible. What is nice is it is digital and it is 
fungible.” 
High mining 
costs (harm) 
Mining Bitcoins (i.e., for the equipment and for 
the power) has a high cost. 
“Mining has become too expensive unless you 
have subsidized electricity.” 
Robust technical 
features 
(benefit) 
Whether the software lacks backs and whether 
it operates flawlessly despite heavy network 
use. 
“When I look at a cryptocurrency, I look at the hash 
rate. How much energy is burnt in creating the 
currency? How resistant is it to hacking? How 
censorship unfriendly is the currency?” 
“I look for infrastructure, liquidity, proof of work, 
hashing algorithm, etc.” 
Technical 
limitations 
(harm) 
Doubts regarding basic technical and 
functional requirements of Bitcoin (e.g., 
scalability, the encryption algorithm’s 
robustness, futureproofness). 
“In future, will it be hacked? Can someone 
manipulate transactions?” 
High-energy 
consumption 
(harm) 
The property of Bitcoin’s network to require 
large amounts of energy to operate. 
“The bitcoin network consumes more energy than 
Ireland.” 
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Table D4. Self-governance  
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Subcultural 
influences 
(benefit) 
Supports the subculture of a group of 
people who regularly interact with each 
other and share a common set of interests, 
values, and needs. 
“Bitcoin is like a meta-nation. There is a set of 
people who form a subculture. The Bitcoin 
embassies are an extension of that I’m dialed 
(connected) up to a lot of people, networks all over 
the world. I just call them up, and we talk about 
random stuff, not necessarily Bitcoin. I might be 
going to Thailand; they will give you money if you 
need money. You have a shared language, shared 
culture, and shared money. There is a lot of social 
value (from participating in the Bitcoin economy).” 
Self-regulation 
(benefit) 
An organization that regulates itself without 
intervention from external parties.  
“Peer influence is a driving factor (in this 
ecosystem).” 
Lack of consensus 
(harm) 
The property of open source communities 
that do not have a strong hierarchy or a 
leadership whereby decision-making 
processes can be extremely difficult.  
“Community lost trust in the protocol or community 
fractures more and more into competing forks.” 
Concentration of 
mining power 
(harm) 
Mining measured in mega hashes per 
second has increasingly become controlled 
by large corporations that can scale their 
operations due to the need to buy 
specialized hardware and pay large power 
bills. As a result, a concentration in mining 
power arises since a few large players 
control the market. 
“concentration of power in miners hands is a bane” 
“51% of the miners are in 1 country.” 
“No it didn't succeed and it won’t allow miners hold 
the power to software upgrades.” 
 
Table D5. Ownership and Property  
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Lack of physicality 
(harm) 
The property whereby one can physically 
hold and account for something. 
“I can’t physically carry it around with me like I can 
with cash.” 
“No bank means there is no evidence if the 
account is from a real person or computer 
generated.” 
Investment and 
trade 
(benefit) 
A Bitcoin property that allows one to use it as 
an investment instrument. 
“I hold Bitcoin.”  
“I use Bitcoin to speculate.” 
“It is a safe investment away from government’s 
prying eyes.” 
Property rights 
(benefit) 
The ability to indisputably claim one owns 
assets. 
“I control my money.” 
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Table D6. Responsible Innovation  
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Social, legal and 
ethical benefits 
(benefit) 
New implementations that solve problems 
in existing implementations 
 
“What Bitcoin does is de-risk illegitimate 
transactions. How can you make transactions as 
safe as possible?”  
 
“Here is the reason we don’t like drugs. Because of 
many externalities linked with it (Bitcoin), it is NOT 
safe. What if Bitcoin trade can remove those 
externalities?”  
Poor environmental 
sustainability 
(harms) 
Validating transactions, issuing new 
cryptocurrencies, and modifying 
transactions require a large amount of 
power. 
“It costs about (several) million dollars to validate 
transactions. It’s a machine that runs on energy 
and works so that the underserviced can be 
serviced.” 
 
Table D7. Privacy 
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Anonymity and privacy 
of sensitive transactions 
(benefit) 
The quality or state of being unknown 
or unidentifiable.  
“People use it for peer-to-peer anonymous 
transactions.” 
Lack of traceability 
(harms) 
The ability to hide various aspects of 
a transaction (e.g., value, identities of 
senders/receivers, time, etc.) from 
anyone (e.g., governments, legal 
enforcement agencies, etc.) not 
involved in the transaction. 
“Obvious reasons why someone (would use it) is 
hiding the trail.” 
Transparent 
transactions (benefit) 
The blockchain’s nature to record 
each and every transaction and the 
end user’s ability to query the 
blockchain for the transaction using 
services such as blockchain.info.  
“Information is transparent.” 
 
“Since the technology is still new, there are multiple 
outlets in which these "coins" are shown to have 
"bugs" in them, allowing for the transparency of the 
Blockchain to be obfuscated...defeating the purpose 
of keeping transactions visible to anyone.” 
 
“My main focus is on insurance-related products that 
are cheaper and more transparent.” 
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Table D8. Trust  
Value 
(benefit/harms) 
Meaning Quotes from focus group and email interviews 
Security 
(benefit) 
Implies controls that provide 
confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability for all system 
components.  
“Security! More secure than the current monetary system - 
ever loose that 10 dollar bill you stuck in your pocket or got 
stolen out of your glove compartment” (Cannot happen with 
crypto unless you lose your private key or personally hand 
over your money). 
“The bitcoin Blockchain is far more secure than other 
systems” 
Stigma 
(harm) 
Projects an undesirable and 
untrustworthy image for anyone 
associated with it through 
association. 
“We’ve all been robbed…You have to suspend a lot of 
beliefs (to buy Bitcoin)—(Many) young people are robbed or 
scammed…Most of us lose Bitcoins running behind ideas 
thinking bad ideas are good ideas and then lose out. I put 
money in a very bad scam with a 1% return per day”. 
Volatility (harm) 
The standard deviation of 
exchange price as compared to 
other assets (e.g., USD or gold). 
“These cryptocurrencies are more established and fluctuate 
less” 
“Bitcoin is more volatile than any other asset” 
Investment risk 
(harm) 
The ability of an asset class to 
receive backing from government 
collateral (guarantee) or some 
form of insurance from a bank. 
“Banks or governments don’t guarantee the value”. 
 
“If my bitcoin is stolen no one will return it to me” 
Irreversible 
transactions 
(benefit) 
Permanently recorded, 
irreversible transaction. 
“Irreversible transactions in which bitcoin's payment method 
is 100% irreversible and cannot be charged back.” 
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